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Abstract

For over a decade, women seeking asylum from persecution inflicted by their abusive husbands and partners
have found little protection in the United States. During that time, domestic violence-based asylum cases have
languished in limbo, been denied, or occasionally been granted in unpublished opinions that have not
provided a much-needed adjudicative standard. The main case setting forth the pre-Obama approach to
domestic violence-based asylum is rife with misunderstanding of the nature of domestic violence and
minimization of the role that society plays in the proliferation of domestic violence. Fortunately, however, a
recent Obama-administration legal brief indicates that women fleeing countries where governments are
unable or unwilling to protect them from their abusive husbands finally may be able to avail themselves of U.S.
asylum law. This article proposes a workable standard for adjudicating such claims. Based in part on
psychological research on the dynamics of abusive relationships, particularly the phenomenon known as
“separation violence,” this article formulates a particular social group that satisfies the various legal elements
for political asylum: “women who have left severely abusive relationships.” This social group is based on
research demonstrating that abusers strike out with increased violence when their partners leave the
relationships, in many cases even killing them. This article explores the dynamics of abusive relationships, the
failure of U.S. adjudicators to understand those dynamics, and the application of international human rights
law to domestic violence survivors.
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INTRODUCTION
Maria Elena fears for her life. For years she has lived under the
rule of a despot intent on maintaining absolute control of his realm.
As a member of a historically oppressed tribe with few political rights,
Maria Elena is a prime target for the dictator’s calculated methods of
maintaining control. He has randomly imprisoned, tortured, beaten,
and threatened to kill Maria Elena over a period of several years. The
torture is worse when Maria Elena takes any action that challenges
the despot’s absolute authority. Maria Elena tried to flee once, but
people with whom she sought shelter turned out to be agents of the
despot and alerted him to her whereabouts. When he found her, he
nearly killed her. Maria Elena has now accepted the reality that there
is no safe place for her in her country. She has left her children with
her parents and is going to flee to the United States.
In this scenario, the classic refugee described above would apply
for refugee protection in the form of asylum after reaching safety in
the United States. She would claim asylum on the basis that she fears
persecution in the form of torture and possible death. There would
be little question as to the basis of her claim. Research on the
country and its tyrannical ruler would clearly document the abuses
suffered by members of Maria Elena’s tribe, particularly when those
members had challenged the ruler’s authority. If she were credible,
and if she met her burden of proof, the United States, a country of
refuge, would welcome Maria Elena with open arms.
Maria Elena, however, is not a classic refugee. The tyrant is her
husband. His realm is their home. Her tribe consists of women in
general, and more particularly, women with whom her husband is in
a relationship. The agents who sent her back to him are his family,
her family, or members of her government who are unable or
unwilling to issue or enforce a protective order. The beatings,
torture, and threats against her life are the same, as is the reason for
the abuse: the retention of absolute power. Nevertheless, it is likely
that Maria Elena will not be entitled to the same protection as the
classic refugee.
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In 1999, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) held in
1
Matter of R-A- that a woman who had fled severe domestic violence
did not qualify as a refugee, and was thus ineligible for asylum
protection in the United States. The basis for the Board’s denial of
asylum was that the applicant, a Guatemalan national named Rodi
Alvarado, could not prove that the persecution she suffered occurred
on account of one of the five protected grounds listed in the
refugee definition: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
2
membership in a particular social group. Alvarado argued that
“her husband necessarily imputed to her the view that she believed
3
women should not be controlled and dominated by men.” She also
argued that she was a member of a particular social group consisting
of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live
4
under male domination.” Nevertheless, the Board decided that
Alvarado had failed to establish that her husband persecuted her
“on account of . . . [her] political opinion or [her] membership in a
5
particular social group.”
Despite this ruling in Matter of R-A-, people fleeing domestic
6
violence have continued to apply for asylum, sometimes successfully.
1. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded to stay reconsideration
(A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), lifted stay and
remanded for reconsideration 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
2. Id. at 912, 914 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994)).
3. Id. at 916.
4. Id. at 911.
5. Id. at 914.
6. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that an immigration judge granted asylum to Rosa Gutierrez, a defendant in a Hague
Convention case, on June 25, 2002, “on the basis of her status as a victim of domestic
violence”). In a subsequent, unpublished California Court of Appeals case, Gonzalez
v. Gutierrez, the court noted that Ms. Gutierrez was granted asylum based on her
membership in the particular social group, “Mexican women who have suffered
domestic violence,” and that the grant of asylum became final when Immigration
and Naturalization Service withdrew its appeal on December 18, 2002. No. D040063,
2003 WL 22236051, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003); see also Aguirre-Cervantes v.
INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting asylum to a Mexican child who had
suffered physical abuse at the hands of her father on account of her membership in
the social group of her nuclear family); Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328
(BIA 2000) (granting asylum to a woman who suffered physical abuse at the hands of
her orthodox Muslim father on account of her liberal Muslim beliefs); KAREN
MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:
A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 817 (3d ed. 2007) (citing Matter of AN-, No. A73 506 840, Decision of the Court (Philadelphia Immigration Court,
Dec. 22, 2000) (granting asylum to a Jordanian woman who feared persecution by
her husband and his family)); id. (citing Matter of J-J-, Decision of the Court
(York Immigration Court, Apr. 10, 2001) (granting asylum to a Spanish Roma
woman who feared being returned “to an abusive marriage . . . by elders of the Roma
ethnic community”)). See generally Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims
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The agencies responsible for adjudicating asylum claims, the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, have struggled with how to adjudicate domestic violencebased asylum claims. For example, the Department of Justice stayed
the Board’s ruling in Matter of R-A- and proposed regulations for
7
Attorneys for the
adjudicating gender-based asylum claims.
Department of Homeland Security and attorneys for Alvarado
re-briefed the case per the request of Attorney General John Ashcroft
8
in 2004. In its new brief, the Department of Homeland Security
conceded that Alvarado, because of her particular circumstances,
9
qualified for asylum. Nevertheless, Alvarado still has not received a
final grant of asylum, and the Department of Justice has still not
issued final regulations governing the adjudication of gender-based
10
asylum claims.
One of the obstacles preventing the resolution of Alvarado’s case
and others like it is the lingering inability of U.S. jurists and
policymakers to fully understand the nature of domestic violence.
The Board’s majority opinion in Matter of R-A- and its proposed
regulations demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of a
number of factors pertaining to domestic violence—factors involving
psychology, economics, culture, law, and philosophy. One of the
most glaring misunderstandings concerns the psychology of domestic
11
violence, especially the theory of separation violence.
of Gender Violence: An Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Decisions,
2003 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2003) (conducting a study on the impact of Matter of R-Aon women’s claims before the Board and individual immigration judges and
concluding that some adjudicators view the vacation of the decision as broadening
the possibilities for gender-related claims).
7. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,588–98
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
8. Matter of R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanding for reconsideration 22
I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001) & 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). Attorney General
Ashcroft’s decision remanded the case to the Board and required the Board to
postpone hearing the case until the final version of the proposed regulations were
published. Id.
9. See Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Resp’t’s Eligibility for
Relief at 2, Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter “DHS
Brief 2004”] (arguing that “under some limited circumstances a victim of domestic
violence can establish eligibility for asylum on this basis, and that the applicant in this
case has established such eligibility”).
10. Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008), lifting stay imposed in 23 I. &
N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanding for reconsideration 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001)
& 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). Attorney General Mukasey’s decision lifted the
stay that required the Board to await publication of the final regulations. Id. at 630–
31.
11. See infra notes 57–75 and accompanying text (explaining the phenomenon
known as “separation violence”).
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In the scenario described above, Maria Elena suffered the worst
abuse when she tried to flee the country and was then caught.
By leaving the relationship, the battered woman is engaging in the
ultimate challenge to her abuser’s power, authority, and control. She
is, in effect, pulling the trigger by committing an act that she cannot
take back. Regardless of whether the abuser forces her to return or
whether she returns on her own, the abuser now knows that she is
capable of leaving him, and he escalates his abuse in order to punish
her for her challenge to his authority and to ensure that such a
12
challenge does not happen again.
An understanding of the theory of separation violence is crucial to
any legal analysis of a battered woman’s claim for refugee protection.
The Board declined to grant Alvarado’s claim because the Board
failed to see a nexus between the abuse that Alvarado suffered and
13
her membership in a particular social group. Part of the basis for
this failure was the Board’s perception that Alvarado’s situation was a
random, private one, characterized by bad luck and a poor choice of
14
spouse on her part.
This perception is evidence of the Board’s
ignorance of the psychology of domestic violence, particularly the
effects of leaving an abusive relationship. Had the Board been aware
of the theory of separation violence, and had it understood the
theory’s statistically based underpinnings, it would have identified
Alvarado’s fear of future persecution as having developed on account

12. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants:
A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 258 (2003) (“Not only can fleeing
fail to stop the criminal behavior, it may incite an escalation of the violence,
sometimes even leading to murder of the battered partner.”).
13. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 920–23 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded
to stay reconsideration (A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration 23 I. & N. Dec. 694
(A.G. 2005), lifted stay and remanded for reconsideration 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
14. The Board recounted the testimony of Dr. Bersing, an expert on the
conditions of Rodi Alvarado’s native country of Guatemala, as follows:
[Dr. Bersing] testified that husbands are supposed to honor, respect, and
take care of their wives, and that spouse abuse is something that is present
“underground” or “underneath in the culture.” But if a woman chooses the
wrong husband her options are few in countries such as Guatemala, which
lack effective methods for dealing with the problem.
Id. (emphasis added).
[T]he arbitrary nature of the attacks further suggests it was not the
respondent’s claimed social group characteristics that he sought to
overcome. The record indicates that there is nothing the respondent could
have done to have satisfied her husband and prevented further abuse.
Id. at 921.
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of a clear, recognizable, and narrow social group: “women who have
15
left severely abusive relationships.”
This Article seeks to (1) explain that the persecution suffered by
domestic violence victims is neither random, nor limited to the
victims’ particular circumstances, and (2) demonstrate that a fuller
understanding of the psychology of domestic violence—and the
theory of separation violence in particular—provides a clear
framework for finding that survivors of severe domestic violence are
eligible for asylum. Part I describes the psychology of domestic
violence: the Cycle of Violence that keeps battered women trapped
in abusive relationships and the separation violence that is likely to
occur after a battered woman leaves an abusive relationship. Part II
provides an overview of international refugee law and U.S. asylum
law, and discusses the formulation of battered women’s asylum claims
in the United States. Part III explains and analyzes “membership in a
particular social group,” one of the five grounds upon which an
individual may seek asylum. Part IV proposes a new social group
upon which battered women may successfully claim asylum:
membership in the particular social group of “women who have left
severely abusive relationships.”
I.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

This Article contends that domestic violence is a legitimate basis
for refugee protection because the psychology of domestic violence
15. The Authors of this Article acknowledge that battering occurs against men
and that battering occurs in both homosexual and heterosexual relationships. This
Article, and the social group proposed in this Article, focus only on women for two
reasons. First, a 2003 study found that the vast majority of intimate partner
violence—eighty-five percent—is committed against women. Callie Marie Rennison,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
CRIME DATA BRIEF, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, at 1 (2003),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.
The study also found that
intimate partner violence comprised twenty percent of violence committed against
women, whereas intimate partner violence comprised only three percent of violence
committed against men. Id.; see also Ronet Bachman, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT 6 (1994) (finding that
women experienced ten times as many incidents of violence by an intimate partner
than did men, and that most acts of spousal abuse are repeated an average of six
times a year and escalate in severity and intensity over time). Second, the domestic
violence addressed in this Article—that which occurs against women in countries
where governments are unable or unwilling to protect domestic violence victims—
is virtually inextricable from patriarchal notions of male domination over women.
See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST
THE PATRIARCHY 24 (1979) (discussing how “men who assault their wives are actually
living up to cultural prescriptions that are cherished in Western society—
aggressiveness, male dominance, and female subordination”).
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reveals that batterers neither choose nor abuse their victims at
random. This Part first discusses Dr. Lenore Walker’s identification
of the “Cycle of Violence” that occurs in domestic abuse relationships
in order to demonstrate that abusers are motivated by a need to
obtain dominance and control similar to the dominance and control
exhibited in more traditional refugee cases, such as the oppressive
dictator seeking to dominate and control the citizens of a country.
This Part then explains that because abusers act within the privacy of
their homes rather than within the public sphere, as classic despots
act, they target their victims differently, but with no more or less
randomness than a despot’s security forces target perceived and
actual dissidents. Finally, this Part addresses the theory of “separation
violence,” which explains why the risk of violence and death increases
exponentially when an individual flees an abusive relationship.
A. Definition of Terms
According to the Department of Justice’s Office on Violence
Against Women, domestic violence is “a pattern of abusive behavior
in any relationship that is used by one partner to gain or maintain
16
power and control over another intimate partner.” The Department
of Justice further explains that “[d]omestic violence [includes]
physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or
17
threats of actions that influence another person.” Physical abuse is
invariably coupled with nonphysical abuse, including verbal acts of
intimidation, manipulation, humiliation, isolation, and coercion
18
toward the victim, economic exploitation, and terrorizing behaviors.
As the term is used in this Article, the term “domestic violence” refers
to physical and nonphysical abuse that rises to the level of
persecution. Generally, the term “persecution” refers to severe abuse
19
that threatens an individual’s life or well-being.
16. U.S. Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women: About
Domestic Violence, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not define the term
“persecution.” Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)). Its definition has been left to court interpretation.
See, e.g., Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (defining persecution
as acts that “rise above mere harassment,” such as “detention, arrest, interrogation,
prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveillance,
beatings, or torture” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales,
411 F.3d 977, 983 (8th Cir. 2005) (defining persecution as harm “involv[ing] a threat
to one’s life or freedom” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lie v. Ashcroft,
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Physical abuse is “any behavior that involves the intentional use of
one’s body against the body of another person in such a way that
there is risk of physical injury, regardless of whether the behavior
20
results in actual injury.” Some examples of physical abuse include
“hitting, pushing, shoving, punching, pounding, slapping, or [using]
21
a weapon or object to injure.”
Psychological abuse by itself can also be an insidious form of abuse.
It is often difficult to detect, but can be even more difficult for the
22
woman to bear than the physical abuse.
Such abuse includes:
taunts; verbal put-downs of the victim’s appearance, intelligence, or
competence as a wife, lover, or mother; threats of harm; and other
23
degrading language.
B. Understanding the “Cycle of Violence”: Dr. Lenore Walker’s
Groundbreaking Work
Dr. Lenore Walker was the first scholar to identify the “battering
24
cycle,” now commonly known as the “Cycle of Violence.” Dr. Walker
theorizes that it is a misconception that battered women are abused
constantly, or abused totally at random; instead, she suggests that
25
there is a distinguishable cycle of violence. Dr. Walker’s research
reveals that most battered women experience a similar cycle of
26
violence even though the women have distinct relationships. This
cycle is critical to understanding patterns that occur within violent
relationships and the reasons why battered women so often remain
27
in, or return to, their abusive relationships.

396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005) (defining persecution as “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a
threat to life or freedom”); Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1997)
(defining persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who
differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20. MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED WOMAN 22
(1992).
21. Id.
22. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 59 (1979) [hereinafter WALKER,
BATTERED WOMAN]. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE (1989)
[hereinafter WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE] (discussing her interviews with battered
women and her finding that psychological abuse through attacks on self-esteem had
the most hurtful and debilitating effects).
23. DUTTON, supra note 20, at 25–27.
24. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 55.
25. Id.
26. See WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 22, at 42 (reporting that, even
though the “Cycle of Violence” does not occur in all abusive relationships, it did
occur in approximately two-thirds of the 1,600 incidents that Dr. Walker studied).
27. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 55.
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The Cycle of Violence has three distinct phases: (1) the “tensionbuilding phase,” (2) the “explosion or acute battering incident,” and
28
(3) the “calm, loving respite.” As discussed below, this cycle ensures
that the abuser achieves and maintains his primary goal: control over
and domination of his spouse.
1.

Phase one: tension-building
The tension-building phase is characterized by an environment in
29
which the woman feels the need to walk on eggshells. As Dr. Walker
describes, the woman “usually attempts to calm the batterer through
30
the use of techniques that have proved previously successful.” She
31
may “become nurturing [or] compliant,” anticipating his moods, or
32
she may attempt to avoid him. Despite her attempts, the batterer
33
may engage in “minor battering incidents.”
During this phase, the woman tends to conceal or deny her own
anger toward the abuser and feels responsible for any abuse that
34
occurs.
She will “often identify[] with the batterer’s faulty
reasoning” for the battering, and she may begin to “rationalize[] that
35
At other times, she may
perhaps she did deserve the abuse.”
minimize the abuse and blame it on the situation, stress, or alcohol
36
and drug abuse.
The tension-building phase may continue at a constant level for
months or years because neither partner wants the next phase—the
37
acute battering phase—to occur. In order to prevent the situation
from escalating into the next phase, the woman may endeavor
“to control as many external factors as possible” and to conceal the
38
abusive behavior from family and friends.
Despite the efforts to avoid a battering incident, however, the
situation begins to spiral out of control. The abuser’s verbal
39
humiliation and abuse increase along with his physical abuse.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 56–59.
30. Id. at 56.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 56–57.
34. Id. at 56.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 56–57.
37. See id. at 58 (describing a situation in which ten years passed before the
batterer returned to the acute battering phase because the couple’s child was killed
in a car accident).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 59.
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As the woman becomes exhausted from her efforts to deny her anger
and prevent further abuse, she becomes more fragile and tends to
40
withdraw. As the abuser senses her withdrawal, he becomes more
41
anxious, and “[t]ension between the two becomes unbearable.”
At the end of the tension-building phase, control is lost, and the
second phase begins.
2.

Phase two: acute battering

The acute battering phase is the culmination of the tension that
42
has been building during the first phase. Sometimes the woman
herself provokes the attack because she can no longer endure what
43
Dr. Walker describes as “her terror, her anger, or anxiety.” The
battering that occurs during this phase is distinguishable from the
minor battering that may have occurred during the first phase
because of the batterer’s increased rage, destructiveness, and
44
intensity.
Even after the abuse occurs, the acute battering phase may not be
45
entirely over. Women often delay seeking help immediately after
46
the acute battering because they fear further battering. Dr. Walker
explains that “the battered woman knows that when the police leave
she will be left alone with the batterer again, and she is terrified of
47
being further abused.”
3.

Phase three: calm respite
The post-battering calm respite “is characterized by extremely
48
loving, kind, and contrite behavior by the batterer.” The tension
and abuse from the first and second phases have disappeared, and
49
the abuser enters a period of contrition and remorse. However, it is
important to note that the abuser also believes that the woman has

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 60–61. Dr. Walker lists some of the “psychophysiological symptoms”
that battered women experience: “sleepless nights, loss of appetite, . . . overeating,
oversleeping, and constant fatigue” as well as “tension headaches, stomach ailments,
high blood pressure, allergic skin reactions, and heart palpitations.” Id. at 61.
44. Id. at 59–60.
45. Id. at 60 (noting that the battering phase “lasts from two to twenty-four hours,
although some women have reported a steady reign of terror for a week or more”).
46. Id. at 64–65.
47. Id. at 65.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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learned her lesson and will never “provoke” him again. The calm
respite is the point in an abusive relationship that makes leaving so
51
difficult. The batterer’s kindness, love, and sometimes his genuine
interest in reforming during this phase support her belief that he will
52
never batter her again. He—and his family and friends—will also
remind her of how much he needs her and how hurt he will be if she
53
leaves. After the calm respite, however, the relationship inevitably
cycles back to the tension-building phase, and the acute battering
phase will follow unless the woman can manage to break the Cycle of
54
Violence.
55
Breaking the Cycle of Violence is an extremely difficult endeavor.
Severe physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, lack of self-esteem,
financial interdependency, guilt, family obligations, societal or
cultural factors, the abuser’s relentless quest for control, and the
victim’s hope for change are all interwoven into the abusive
relationship, creating a virtual prison from which escape is difficult at
56
best, and deadly at worst.
C. Separation Violence
It is a common misperception that leaving the abusive relationship
will result in increased safety for the victim. Empirical research
shows, however, that a woman is at greater risk of injury or death
57
when she leaves an abusive relationship. Thus, even when a woman
50. Id. at 65−66. Dr. Walker also notes that although it was the batterer who was
at fault for the abuse, he makes the woman feel guilty and responsible during the
honeymoon phase. Id. at 66–67.
51. See id. at 66−70.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 66–67.
54. Id. at 69–70.
55. Id. at 68–69.
56. Id. at 66–70.
57. See, e.g., Deborah K. Anderson & Daniel G. Saunders, Leaving an Abusive
Partner: An Empirical Review of Predictors, the Process of Leaving, and Psychological
Well-Being, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 163, 179 (2003) (reporting that twenty-four
to thirty-five percent of women who leave abusive relationships experience more
severe abuse after separation); Walter S. DeKeseredy, Separation/Divorce Sexual
Assault, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 637, 637−38 (Claire M.
Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2008) [hereinafter DeKeseredy, Sexual Assault]
(“Other key findings include the fact that seventy-four percent of the sample were
sexually abused when they expressed a desire to leave a relationship.”); Walter S.
DeKeseredy et al., Separation/Divorce Sexual Assault: The Contribution of Male Support,
1 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 228, 237−38 (2006) (finding that married women
experience more intense separation violence than women who were cohabitating
with their batterers); Walter S. DeKeseredy, McKenzie Rogness & Martin D. Schwartz,
Separation/Divorce Sexual Assault: The Current State of Social Scientific Knowledge,
9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 675, 677−84 (2004) [hereinafter DeKeseredy,
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is emotionally ready to leave an abusive relationship, the very real fear
58
of escalated violence—commonly known as “separation violence” —
59
or even death may prevent her from doing so.
In their 1993 study of spousal homicide, Margo Wilson and Martin
Daly analyzed spousal homicide statistics from Canada, New South
60
Wales (Australia), and Chicago. The statistical data showed that,
in Canada and New South Wales, the number of wives killed by their
husbands was approximately three times higher than the number of
61
husbands killed by their wives. Those figures increased significantly
when the partners were separated or divorced: women were victims
nine times more frequently than men in Canada, fifteen times more
frequently in New South Wales, and nearly three times more
62
frequently in Chicago. Based on their analysis of this data, Wilson
and Daly arrived at the following conclusion:
Recognizing that women incur risk of severe violence at separation
necessitates action to guarantee their safety, but the coercive use of
such violence and threats implies more. Husbands threaten and
use violence to constrain women’s options, and continued failure
to attend to these utilitarian aspects of violence against wives
63
constitutes a denial of women’s entitlement to autonomy.

Wilson and Daly found that “wives are much more likely to be slain
by their husbands when separated from them than when
64
co-residing.” This finding and other studies confirm that separation

Rogness & Schwartz, Scientific Knowledge] (reviewing studies of separation sexual
assault, which all point to the conclusion that separation sexual assault poses a major
risk to the health and safety of women trying to leave abusive relationships); Robert
Walker, TK Logan, Carol E. Jordan & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, An Integrative Review of
Separation in the Context of Victimization: Consequences and Implications for Women,
5 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 143, 158−60 (2004) (reporting that psychological abuse
was experienced by ninety-five percent of women after separating from their abusive
relationships while thirty-nine percent experienced continued physical abuse).
58. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (coining the term “separation assault” to
define the higher rate of assault on women following separation from violent
relationships).
59. See Anderson & Saunders, supra note 57, at 179 (noting that women who
leave abusive relationships “are about 25 times more likely to be assaulted by
ex-mates . . . and 5 times more likely to be murdered”).
60. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement,
8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 5 (1993).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id. at 8.
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from the abusive relationship results in the woman’s increased risk of
65
harm and even death.
Two dominant theories that seek to explain separation violence are
66
Robert Borstein’s “dependency-possessiveness model” and Wilson
67
and Daly’s theory of “male sexual proprietariness.” According to the
dependency-possessiveness model, “the dependent person’s
insecurity and abandonment fears may lead him to become abusive
68
when he believes his partner will reject them.” Similarly, the theory
65. See JUDITH A. ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS: CRIMES INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN WOMEN
SINCE 1880, at 52 (1990) (stating that in late nineteenth-century Australia, nearly half
of murders, manslaughters, or attempted murders committed by husbands against
their wives took place while they were separated); ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED
WOMEN KILL 73 (1987) (noting a study that showed that up to fifty percent of wives
who left abusive husbands were found by their husbands and were terrorized or
abused); PETER D. CHIMBOS, MARITAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF INTERSPOUSE HOMICIDE
47–48 (1978) (noting the results of a study in which sixty-five percent of the study
participants, each of which had committed interspouse homicide, stated that they
had separated from their spouse at least once); ALLISON WALLACE, HOMICIDE:
THE SOCIAL REALITY 98 (1986) (stating that thirty-nine percent of male subjects in a
study killed their wives while they were separated); MARGO WILSON & MARTIN DALY,
HOMICIDE 196−98 (1988) [hereinafter WILSON & DALY, HOMICIDE] (explaining that
when a wife leaves a relationship, her husband may feel jealous and may fear losing
control over his wife’s reproductive ability, and that these feelings may lead to
homicide); G.W. Barnard et al., Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder,
10 BULL. AM. ASS’N OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 271, 279 (1982) (noting that threat of
separation is usually a trigger for violence); Irene Hanson Frieze & Angela Browne,
Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 207 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Torny eds.,
1989) (noting that battered wives who leave their husbands are often followed,
harassed, and sometimes killed).
66. Robert F. Bornstein, The Complex Relationship Between Dependency and Domestic
Violence: Converging Psychological Factors and Social Forces, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 595,
598 (2006).
67. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel, THE
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 289
(1992) [hereinafter Wilson & Daly, Man Who Mistook His Wife].
68. Bornstein, supra note 66, at 598; see DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC
ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 143 (1995)
(“[A] fundamental principle of attachment research is that anger follows unmet
attachment needs.”); see also id. (citing Myriam Mongrain et al., Perceptual Biases, Affect,
and Behavior in the Relationships of Dependents and Self-Critics, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (1998)) (finding an increase in hostile behavior on the part of the
boyfriends of dependent women during conflict resolution); Hardeo Ojha & Rajiv R.
Singh, Relationship of Marriage-Role Attitude with Dependence Proneness and Insecurity in
University Students, 28 PSYCHOLOGIA 249, 252 (1985) (finding a strong correlation
between dependent personality traits and traditional beliefs about marriage roles).
But see NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN:
NEW INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 37 (1998) (identifying a second
type of batterer who is not emotionally dependent on his wife but is “incapable of
forming truly intimate relationships with others”). Doctors Jacobsen and Gottman
nicknamed this group of batterers “cobras,” describing them as follows:
Cobras taunt their wives by pushing them away. Yet they want their wives to
be there for them when they need something: sex, companionship, money,
or someone to get high with. Cobras are very frightening to their wives, and
yet at the same time captivating. This combination makes Cobras very hard
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of male proprietariness indicates that “men take a proprietary view of
69
women’s sexuality and reproductive capacity,” an indication borne
70
out by such phenomena as the purchasing of wives and the high
71
value placed on female chastity. Wilson and Daly cite to spousal
homicide studies finding that “the leading identified substantive
72
[motive for spousal homicide] is invariably ‘jealousy.’”
The dependency-possessiveness model, male proprietariness, and
the undeniable frequency of separation violence demonstrate that
domestic violence is not random; rather, it is a pattern of systematic
abuse by which the abuser seeks to dominate his partner through the
use of power and control tactics including emotional, sexual, and
73
physical violence.
If the fragile sense of power and control the
batterer derives from his abusive relationship is threatened, he will
74
often increase the abuse. Once the violence has started, it not only
75
continues, but it often escalates in frequency and in lethality.
D. Escaping Separation Violence
Statistically, those women who ultimately succeed in leaving their
partners “have had approximately five previous separations prior to
76
their ultimate and final dissolution of the relationship.” Research
also suggests that, while many women in abusive relationships make
77
multiple attempts to leave, half of those women ultimately stay. The
cycles of leaving and returning “reflect not indecision per se but a
complex pattern of behavior that involves not only the effect of the

to escape from. Their tactics of control and intimidation are remarkably
effective in terrifying their wives into submission.
Id. at 84.
69. Wilson & Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife, supra note 67, at 303.
70. WILSON & DALY, HOMICIDE, supra note 65, at 188.
71. Wilson & Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife, supra note 67, at 313.
72. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Evolutionary Social Psychology and Family
Homicide, 242 SCIENCE 519, 521 (1988).
73. West Virginia Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Brief Amicus Curiae,
Thomas v. Morris, Clay County Civil Action No. 08-DV-66, at 2–3 (Sept. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/briefs/oct09/35141Amicus.pdf.
74. See Hallie Bongar White & James G. White, Testifying About Lethality Risk
Factors, Sw. Center for Law and Policy & U.S. Dept. of Justice Office on
Violence Against Women, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.swclap.org/pdfs/
LETHALITYRISKFACTORS.pdf (stating that a batterer who believes that his partner
is “undermining his power and control” is more likely to kill his partner).
75. See id. (“The most dangerous time for victims is at the time of separation.”).
76. LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE
ABUSE 60 (2003).
77. Id. at 60 & n.27 (citing Douglas K. Snyder & Nancy S. Scheer, Predicting
Disposition Following Brief Residence at a Shelter for Battered Women, 9 AM. J. CMTY.
PSYCHOL. 559, 559–65 (1981)).
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violence and the partner’s influence but also other psychological and
78
sociocultural factors.”
Women who do permanently leave have finally arrived at a point in
their lives where they can break the Cycle of Violence for good.
Because this irrevocable break with the abuser creates, in many cases,
a risk of increased harm or death for the woman, she must seek
protection from the state. If she lives in a country that does not offer
protection, she must seek that protection abroad, often in the form
of political asylum. However, as the next Part discusses, that avenue
is often not available to her.
II. REFUGEE LAW
A. The Classic Refugee in International Law
International law protecting refugees was written with a discrete
group of people in mind: the survivors of World War II atrocities
79
who were scattered throughout Europe at the end of the war.
To address the post-World War II refugee situation, the United
Nations promulgated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
80
Refugees. The 1951 Convention provided an official definition of a
“refugee”:
[A]ny person who . . . [a]s a result of events occurring before
1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such
81
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

78. Id.; see also BROWNE, supra note 65, at 110 (listing many factors—such as
common property, children, and mutual friends—that make it hard for women to
leave an abusive relationship).
79. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 3–10 (June 1992), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae6bd5a0.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR Introduction] (tracing
the history of post-World War II refugee protection from the establishment of the
International Refugee Organization in 1947, to the adoption of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the establishment of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees).
80. July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951
Convention].
81. Id. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The 1951 Convention also permitted
signatories to restrict protection geographically, specifically, to people who were
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The 1951 Convention prohibited signatory states from returning
persons meeting this definition to countries where they would face
82
future harm.
In the decade following the 1951 Convention, it became evident
that the end of World War II had not brought about an end to the
flow of refugees. New conflicts were producing new refugees, and
83
the 1951 Convention was updated to respond to the situation.
The result was the adoption of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951
84
Convention, which modified the 1951 Convention’s definition of a
refugee by eliminating the date restrictions so that persons fleeing
from events occurring after January 1, 1951 could be considered
85
refugees.
The United States acceded to the 1951 Convention when it signed
86
the 1967 Protocol in 1968. In 1980, the United States codified the
1967 Protocol’s definition of a refugee in domestic law when it passed
87
the Refugee Act of 1980.
Under current U.S. law, individuals
applying for refugee protection in the United States must prove four
elements in order to establish prima facie eligibility for refugee
protection: (a) being outside one’s country and unable or unwilling
to return to it; (b) fearing harm severe enough to constitute
persecution; (c) possessing a well-founded fear of future persecution;
and (d) being a target for persecution on account of one of
the five protected grounds: (1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality,
(4) political opinion, or (5) membership in a particular social
88
group.
Conspicuously absent from the grounds for protection is sex or
gender. The possible reasons for this omission are many and varied,
refugees as a result of “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.” Id. at
6262, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
82. Id. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
83. UNHCR Introduction, supra note 79, at 10.
84. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
85. The 1967 Protocol states,
[T]he term “refugee” shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3
of this article, mean any person within the definition of article I of the
Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951 . . .” and the words “. . . as a result of such events,” in article 1 A (2)
were omitted.
Id. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. The Protocol also eliminated the geographic
restrictions. Id.
86. See 19 U.S.T. at 6223. The Senate ratified the Protocol on October 4, 1968,
and the President signed it on October 15, 1968. Id.
87. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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89

and not the focus of this Article.
Suffice it to say that there is
currently no official refugee protection for women on account of fear
of harm relating to their societal status as women or to their female
90
anatomy.
That is not to suggest that women cannot or do not
receive asylum on account of their societal status as women or on
91
account of their female anatomy—they can and do —but only that
89. See generally E. Dana Neacsu, Gender-Based Persecution as a Basis for Asylum:
An Annotated Bibliography, 1993–2002, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 191 (2003) (presenting a
bibliography of articles that address gender-based persecution as a basis for asylum).
For in-depth discussions regarding the addition of gender as a protected ground,
see generally Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 771 (1995) (examining the attempt to use gender to define a social group for
protected-grounds purposes); Anjana Bahl, Home Is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law
and Gender-Based Claims of Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33 (1997)
(recommending that grounds for persecution need to be expanded to include
victims of gender-based persecution); Arthur C. Helton, Shifting Grounds for Asylum:
Female Genital Surgery and Sexual Orientation, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 467 (1998)
(noting that there is increased debate whether refugee protections should be
extended to include gender and sexual orientation); Emily Love, Equality in Political
Asylum Law: For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 133 (1994) (suggesting that Congress should amend the Refugee Act of 1980 to
add gender-based abuse as a protected ground); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of
Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 119 (2007) [hereinafter Musalo, Floodgates] (explaining that people should not
be concerned that allowing asylum based on gender will result in a flood of claims,
but should focus on solving the violence that causes the claims); Maddie L. Stevens,
Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee
Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 179 (1993) (suggesting that the United States
should add a refugee category specifically for gender); Bret Thiele, Persecution on
Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221 (2000)
(arguing that a gender category needs to be added to the definition of refugee);
David L. Neal, Note, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as
Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (1988) (arguing that women
who are persecuted based on their sex should be granted asylum because they fulfill
the requirements of a social group).
90. See Bahl, supra note 89, at 38 (“Human rights laws have traditionally provided
inadequate protection for women.”); Helton, supra note 89, at 471 (“In terms of the
five bases of refugee status, at least one of which would have to be established to
warrant refugee protection, there is an absence of any terms concerning gender or
sexual orientation.”); Neal, supra note 89, at 203 (noting that historically there has
been no explicit recognition of sex-based persecution).
91. See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 800–03 (9th Cir. 2005)
(permitting the reopening of reconsideration of a denial of asylum for a Somali
woman who had been subjected to female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and holding
that FGM is a “particularly severe form of past persecution” and a “‘permanent and
continuing’ act of persecution”); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 636, 643 (6th Cir.
2004) (granting petition for review of a BIA determination of ineligibility for asylum
to an Ethiopian woman based in part on her fear of her minor daughter being
subjected to FGM); Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing a
denial of asylum for an Ethiopian woman of Amharic ethnicity who was raped by her
supervisor, a man of Tigrean ethnicity); Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368
(BIA 1996) (granting asylum to a Togolese woman who feared FGM); Matter of D-V-,
21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 79–80 (BIA 1993) (granting asylum to a Haitian woman who had
been raped by government soldiers). But see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962–63
(9th Cir. 1996) (denying petition for review of denial of asylum to an Iranian woman
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there is no official category of “sex” or “gender” under which to apply
92
This void leaves it up to advocates and
for refugee protection.
adjudicators to tie gender-based asylum claims to one of the five
protected grounds.
Arguably, however, the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
were designed to allow for the gradual broadening of protection.
93
Neither document defines the term “persecution.”
Refugeproviding countries are thus free to interpret that term according to
94
their own values, and to revise their definition over time.
As discussed below, however, the lack of specific protection has
proven detrimental in cases involving battered women.
B. Battered Women’s Asylum Claims in the United States
1.

U.S. asylum law
In 1990, the U.S. government implemented new regulations
95
Asylum claims fall
governing the adjudication of asylum claims.
under the jurisdiction of two federal agencies. The Department of
because the oppressive gender-specific laws from which she sought asylum applied to
all women in Iran and not solely to the applicant); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,
1241–42, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying petition for review of denial of asylum to an
Iranian woman because her willingness to comply with oppressive gender-specific
laws in order to avoid “74 lashes, a year’s imprisonment, and in many cases brutal
rapes and death” indicated that she did not possess sufficient abhorrence of the laws
to render their application to her persecution); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 662
(2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing a petition for review of a denial of asylum to a Salvadoran
woman who was raped and beaten on several occasions by guerilla forces).
92. See Thiele, supra note 89, at 235 (noting that although the UNHCR has
increasingly recognized the realities of gender-based persecution, “the Commission
only stressed that States must exercise due diligence to prevent violence against
refugee and internally displaced women, without addressing the issue of refugee
status on account of gender persecution”).
93. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1
(Jan. 1992), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e1364.html [hereinafter
UNHCR Handbook] (stating that “[t]here is no universally accepted definition of
“persecution,” and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with
little success”).
94. The UNHCR Handbook provides the following guidance for determining
whether harm rises to the level of persecution:
From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a threat to
life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or
membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious
violations of human rights—for the same reasons—would also constitute
persecution.
Id.
95. Aliens and Nationality, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures,
55 Fed. Reg. 30674-01 (July 27, 1990). The current regulations governing asylum are
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2009).
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Justice oversees the immigration courts and the Board of
96
The Department of Homeland Security
Immigration Appeals.
adjudicates asylum cases for applicants who are not in removal
97
proceedings and prosecutes removal cases before immigration
98
courts and the Board.
Battered women seeking asylum bring their claims in one of three
ways. First, if they are present in the United States and not in
removal proceedings, they may file an application with the
Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Citizenship and
99
Immigration Services (USCIS). Second, battered women who are in
removal proceedings may apply for asylum as a defense to removal by
100
If they are in
filing an application with the immigration court.
removal proceedings as the result of a failed affirmative asylum
101
application, they may renew their claim in immigration court.
Finally, if they are present at a port of entry and do not have the
documents necessary to be admitted to the United States, but they
indicate a fear of returning to their home country, the Department of
Homeland Security Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement may refer them to USCIS for a preliminary assessment
102
of their asylum claim, called a “credible fear interview.” Those who

96. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0–.1 (2009).
97. Id. § 208.14. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 replaced the term “deportation” with the term “removal.” Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 308(e)(1),
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
98. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2.
99. Id. §§ 208.2(a), 208.4(b). The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service’s
regional service center will perform initial processing and will then forward the
application to the applicant’s local asylum office. Id. § 208.4(b)(1). An asylum
officer will then interview the applicant in a non-adversarial proceeding. Id.
§ 208.9(b). If the asylum officer deems the applicant eligible for asylum, the officer
has the authority to grant asylum to the applicant. Id. § 208.14(b). If the asylum
officer decides that the applicant is not eligible for asylum, and the applicant does
not have lawful immigration status, the officer must forward the case to an
immigration judge. Id. § 208.14(c)(1).
100. Id. § 208.2(b).
101. Id. § 208.14(c)(1); see also id. § 208.2 (vesting in immigration judges the
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate asylum claims for individuals in removal
proceedings). An older version of the regulations specified that an immigration
judge’s review of asylum claims shall be “de novo regardless of whether or not a
previous application was filed and adjudicated . . . prior to the initiation of exclusion
or deportation proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1991) (cited in Matter of B-, 20
I. & N. Dec. 427, 429 (BIA 1991)). Immigration judges continue to review claims
referred to them by the Asylum Office de novo even though this standard of review is
no longer specified in the regulations.
See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I.
Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STANFORD L. REV. 295, 308, 326 (2007).
102. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4).
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are found to have a credible fear of persecution are placed in
removal proceedings, where they may file an application for asylum
103
with the immigration court.
2.

Legal bases for battered women’s asylum claims
Battered women from countries that do not provide adequate
protection against domestic violence generally face few hurdles in
establishing the first three elements of a successful asylum claim:
104
demonstrating unwillingness to return to their country, having
105
experienced harm severe enough to rise to the level of persecution,
106
and possessing a well-founded fear of future persecution.
It is the
fourth element, the “on account of a protected ground” requirement,
where battered women’s asylum claims tend to fail. A discussion of
each element of a battered woman’s asylum claim follows.
a.

Unwilling or unable to return to the home country

In discussing a battered woman’s unwillingness or inability to
return to her country, it is essential to understand, as a preliminary
matter, that many abuse victims do not leave their relationships, and
107
that those who do often return to their relationships. As discussed
in Part I of this Article, the Cycle of Violence that entraps and then
imprisons women in abusive relationships is difficult, and in many
cases impossible, to break. Those women who do leave permanently
often do so only after making several attempts to leave over a period
108
of years. The assertiveness inherent in the decision to leave sends a
strong signal to the abuser that his power over his partner is waning,
and in most cases, the decision to leave results in increased violence
109
toward the victim, possibly resulting in her murder.

103. Id. § 208.30(f). If a potential asylum applicant fails to prove to the asylum
officer that she has a credible fear of persecution, she may have the negative credible
fear determination reviewed by an immigration judge. Id. § 208.30(g)(1)–(2). If the
applicant declines review, or the immigration judge also finds that the applicant does
not have a credible fear, she may be removed from the United States. Id.
§ 208.30(g)(1)(ii).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(C).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2).
107. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text (explaining and citing statistics
that show that women do not generally leave abusive relationships).
108. See WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 66–67, 199 (noting that
battered women are most likely to flee during the third phase, but many go back to
their husbands as often as five times before they leave permanently).
109. See discussion supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (detailing the abuse
suffered by women who leave their abusive relationships).
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By the time a battered woman has fled not only her abuser, but also
her country, and by the time she has sought asylum protection, she
usually has arrived at a place in the Cycle of Violence, and a place in
110
her own psyche, where return is no longer an option.
She has
made a number of decisions that were difficult and dangerous to
implement—decisions that, in many respects, are irreversible. Like
Rodi Alvarado and most women fleeing abusive relationships, she has
made and carried out an escape plan to avoid the increased violence
that tends to accompany a decision to leave. If she has children, she
has taken them with her, or if unable to do so, has arranged for their
care. Her inability and unwillingness to return are therefore
111
established, and generally are not in dispute in an asylum claim.
b.

Whether the harm suffered or feared rises to the level of persecution

Persecution is not defined in the 1951 Convention or the 1967
Protocol, nor is it defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Rather, it has been left to individual countries and courts to
112
determine when harm rises to the level of persecution. Generally,
U.S. courts have defined persecution as severe harm, and have
provided examples of harm that does and does not constitute
113
114
115
persecution.
Detention,
severe beatings,
credible threats
110. See WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 198 (explaining that women
who go to safe houses take about three to four weeks to adjust to the idea that they
are not going back home).
111. It is critical that legal professionals working with domestic violence-based
asylum cases—adjudicators, counsel for the refugee applicant, and counsel for the
government—do not confuse multiple returns to the relationship or a lengthy
relationship with lack of subjective fear. As discussed in this Article, the viciousness
of the Cycle of Violence and the reality of separation violence often prevent a woman
from leaving an abusive relationship despite the woman’s terror.
112. See cases and sources cited supra notes 19, 93–94 and accompanying text.
The Board has defined persecution as “the infliction of harm or suffering by a
government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome
a characteristic of the victim.” Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996)
(citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222–23 (BIA 1985)), modified on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
113. Compare Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) (articulating
that “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches,
confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings or torture” may rise to the level of
persecution), and Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
threats and beatings combined with deprivation of livelihood and the inability to
escape amount to persecution), with Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 189–90 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that the denial of citizenship is not persecution even when it results
in statelessness), Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
prosecution for counseling a child not to fight in Iran’s war against Iraq is not
persecution), and De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158–59 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a denial of citizenship and education on the basis of race and nationality was not
persecution).
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116

against a person’s life, extreme deprivation of the ability to make a
117
118
living, and witnessing the death, torture, or rape of a loved one
are all examples of harm that courts have considered serious enough
to rise to the level of persecution.
Battered women experience the types of harm recognized as
persecution by U.S. courts in asylum cases. Therefore, this is an area
where the case of a battered woman is similar in nature to that of the
classic refugee—both are subjected to severe physical and
psychological harm by an entity seeking to control the behavior of
the individual. Because of this similarity, the issue of persecution was
119
not in dispute in Rodi Alvarado’s case, and would not likely be in
dispute in cases of other battered women. Alvarado established
through testimony and corroborating evidence that the frequency
and severity of the abuse she had endured over the years at the hands
120
of her husband, as well as the harm she would likely suffer upon
121
her return to Guatemala, was severe enough to rise to the level of
persecution. If other battered woman can establish through their
own testimony and corroborating evidence that they have endured
multiple severe beatings at the hands of their abusive partners, they
too are not likely to encounter difficulty in establishing that they have
122
suffered harm rising to the level of persecution.
114. See, e.g., Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
detention for ten days accompanied by daily beatings and hard labor constitutes
persecution, even in the absence of serious physical injury).
115. See, e.g., Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the cumulative effects of “specific instances of violence and harassment”
constitute persecution).
116. See, e.g., Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
persistent death threats and assaults against one’s family constitute persecution).
117. See, e.g., Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that
“deliberate imposition of substantial economic disadvantage . . . for reasons of race,
religion, or political opinion” may rise to the level of persecution).
118. See, e.g., Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (approving a
principle that being forced to witness the torture of a child constitutes persecution).
119. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 914 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded
to stay reconsideration (A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G.
2005), lifted stay and remanded for reconsideration, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008)
(stating that “we agree with the Immigration Judge that the severe injuries sustained
by the respondent rise to the level of harm sufficient (and more than sufficient) to
constitute ‘persecution’”).
120. See id. at 908–10 (detailing the severe abuse that Alvarado’s husband inflicted
on her).
121. See id. at 910 (noting that a witness had heard from Alvarado’s sister that
Alvarado’s husband was “going to hunt her down and kill her if she comes back to
Guatemala”).
122. Alvarado’s case, for example, included her own testimony, witness testimony,
expert testimony, and numerous reports and articles on violence against women in
Guatemala. See id. at 908–11.
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Well-founded fear of future persecution

Proving past persecution, however, is only part of the refugee
protection equation. Courts also evaluate whether an applicant has a
well-founded fear of continued persecution if she were to return to
123
her country.
Courts evaluate several factors, discussed below, to
determine whether an applicant’s fear is well-founded.
The inquiry into whether an asylum applicant possesses a wellfounded fear of future persecution contains a two-part analysis:
(1) whether the applicant has a subjective fear of persecution, and
124
(2) whether the applicant’s fear is objectively reasonable. The first
part of the inquiry is usually established fairly simply with the
applicant’s own testimony that she is fearful of returning to her
125
country.
In establishing the second part of the inquiry, however,
the applicant must prove that: (1) she possesses a characteristic or
belief that her “persecutor seeks to overcome” through the infliction
of harm; (2) that the persecutor is “aware or could [easily] become
aware” of the belief or characteristic; (3) that the persecutor is
capable of inflicting harm on the applicant; and (4) that the
126
persecutor is inclined to inflict harm on the applicant.
Under this formulation, a battered woman who can prove past
persecution and government inability or unwillingness to protect her
from future abuse would have little difficulty establishing that her
123. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2009) (establishing that past persecution creates
a presumption that the applicant will suffer future persecution if returned to her
country); see also Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989) (holding that an
applicant who has suffered “atrocious forms of persecution” may be entitled to
asylum as a humanitarian matter even if there is no fear of future persecution
(quoting UNCHR Handbook, supra note 93, at ¶ 136)). The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security may rebut the presumption of future persecution if they show by
a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]here has been a fundamental change in
circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution” or that the applicant could reasonably relocate to another part of the
country in order to avoid future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(i), (1)(ii).
Even in the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant may still
qualify for asylum if she “has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling
or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution,”
or “has established that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer
other serious harm upon removal to that country.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii).
124. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 213 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
125. But see Bridgette A. Carr, We Don’t Need to See Them Cry: Eliminating the
Subjective Apprehension Element of the Well-Founded Fear Analysis for Child Refugee
Applicants, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 535, 544–45 (2006) (pointing out that children may lack
the capacity to understand their situations sufficiently to feel fearful, or may lack the
capacity to articulate their objective fear).
126. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. at 446 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 226), abrogated by Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997).
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fear is objectively reasonable. With respect to the first element, the
characteristic she possesses is fairly obvious: she is a woman and she
127
With respect to the
is the persecutor’s spouse or partner.
remaining three elements, it is self-evident that the persecutor is
aware that his victim is a woman and that she is his spouse; if he has
subjected her to abuse previously, then it is also clear that he is
capable of inflicting and inclined to inflict harm on her.
d. On account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group
In the case of a battered woman, the determination of whether a
fear is well-founded is closely tied to whether the persecution will
occur on account of one of the five protected grounds: (1) race,
(2) religion, (3) nationality, (4) political opinion, or (5) membership
128
in a particular social group.
It is this final element of the refugee
definition, the nexus to a protected ground, upon which so many
domestic violence-based claims fail.
In domestic violence-based asylum cases, race and nationality are
typically irrelevant. In a few cases, applicants successfully claim
religion or political opinion as the nexus. For example, in Matter of
129
S-A-, the applicant applied for asylum on the basis that her religious
beliefs, specifically her liberal interpretation of Islam, conflicted with
130
The Board found
her father’s orthodox interpretation of Islam.
that the applicant’s father persecuted her by beating her in an
131
attempt to overcome her different religious beliefs.
However,
applications for asylum based on domestic violence persecution on
account of religious beliefs are rare. Instead, most survivors of
domestic violence apply for asylum based on their membership in a
particular social group.
127. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Request for Certification and Reversal
of the Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re R-A- (Interim Decision
No. 3403) at 10, Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (No. A 73-753-922)
(arguing that “gender is an appropriate characteristic defining ‘particular social
group’ for asylum purposes”); id. at 20–22 (asserting that “the status of being a wife
or female intimate partner is fundamental to the identity of the individual, and often
immutable”); cf. id. at 9 n.10 (listing a number of cases from foreign courts in which
gender and status as a battered woman were found to be legitimate social groups for
purposes of refugee protection).
128. See, e.g., Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 914 (agreeing with the immigration
judge that the determinative issue for persecution “is whether the harm experienced
by the respondent was, or in the future may be, inflicted ‘on account of’ a statutorily
protected ground”).
129. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000).
130. Id. at 1329.
131. Id. at 1336.
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Like “persecution,” the term “particular social group” is not
defined in the Refugee Convention or in the U.S. Refugee Act. The
Board of Immigration Appeals provided guidance as to what
constitutes a particular social group in 1985 in the precedential
Matter of Acosta case:
[W]e interpret the phrase “persecution on account of membership
in a particular social group” to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience
such as former military leadership or land ownership. The
particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this
construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is
132
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.

Examples of social groups considered valid include sexual
133
134
135
orientation, kinship and family, and former military leadership.
136
However,
Gender, too, has qualified as a particular social group.
even if gender were universally accepted as a viable particular social
group, battered women would still not find universal acceptance as
refugees.
It is indisputable that women suffer various levels of harm on
account of their sex. Gender-based harm includes employment
discrimination, domestic violence, and rape, as well as forced

132. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
133. See, e.g., Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2008) (allowing sexual
orientation to be the basis for a persecution claim); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d
1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that alien homosexuals are members of a
particular social group for purpose of the asylum statute); Amanfi v. Ashcroft,
328 F.3d 719, 724 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that alien homosexuals are members of a
particular social group for purpose of the asylum statute).
134. See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (accepting
nuclear family membership as a particular social group); Matter of H-, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 337, 343 (BIA 1996) (accepting clan membership as a particular social group).
135. See, e.g., Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985) (describing
former military leadership as an innate characteristic), overruled in part by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
136. See id. (noting that the determination of whether sex should be considered a
particular social group should be made on a case-by-case basis); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (considering sex as an innate characteristic that may allow
for membership in a particular social group).
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marriage, female genital mutilation, and “honor crimes.”
Gender
as a social group, when combined with the other criteria for refugee
protection—unwillingness to return due to a well-founded fear of
persecution, and the inability or unwillingness of the applicant’s
138
country to protect her from persecution—is a viable social group.
Nevertheless, refugee protection is often elusive for women who do
not combine their claims with some other ground for refugee
139
protection or with a narrower social group claim.
Despite the
proposal of several potentially viable social groups, a particular social
group that is viable for all battered women seeking asylum has not
emerged.
III. ATTEMPTED AND PROPOSED SOCIAL GROUPS FOR
BATTERED WOMEN
The challenge faced by adjudicators, advocates, and the
government has been to articulate a social group that not only
recognizes the realities of domestic violence but also fits within the
confines of a refugee definition that makes no mention of gender140
based persecution.
Each approach discussed below attempts to
attain this delicate balance, but each ultimately falls short.
137. See Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence
Against Women and “Honor” Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Apr. 5, 2001,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2001/04/05/item-12-integration-human-rightswomen-and-gender-perspective-violence-against-women (defining honor crimes as
“acts of violence, usually murder, committed by male family members against female
family members who are perceived to have brought dishonor upon the family”).
138. See Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United
States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims,
13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 63 (1998) (“The anti-discrimination orientation of the
refugee definition implies that like other grounds of persecution, a particular social
group is also characterized by a marginalized or disadvantaged status in society which
makes members vulnerable to oppression, including (but not limited to) the actual
persecution feared by the claimant.”).
139. See Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards’ Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 557, 590–91 (2000) (asserting that “sex could be sufficient to define a social
group” but women have needed additional characteristics due to the difficulty in
arguing that violence against women is based on gender); Lori Nessel,
“Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article
Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 76 (2004)
(noting that “the United States excludes social groups based solely on sex and
requires strong evidence that the claimant’s membership in a ‘gender-plus’
protected group served as the primary motivation for the persecutor’s conduct”);
see also Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable or Unwilling to
Provide Reasonable Protection from Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States
Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709, 745 (1997) (noting that the gender-plus
requirement “violates the United States’ international and domestic legal duties to
apply all its laws without discrimination”).
140. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
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A. Matter of R-A-: “Women Who Have Been Involved Intimately with
Male Companions Who Believe that Women Are to Live Under
Male Domination”
The immigration judge who heard Rodi Alvarado’s case granted
her application for asylum on the basis of political opinion and
membership in a particular social group: “Guatemalan women who
have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions,
141
who believe that women are to live under male domination.” The
Board of Immigration Appeals paraphrased the immigration judge’s
holding as follows:
[S]uch a group was cognizable and cohesive, as members shared
the common and immutable characteristics of gender and the
experience of having been intimately involved with a male
companion who practices male domination through violence. The
Immigration Judge then held that members of such a group are
targeted for persecution by the men who seek to dominate and
142
control them.

The Board then proceeded to reject that social group for reasons
143
discussed below and reversed the grant of asylum.
On the one
hand, the Board’s reversal of the grant represents a colossal failure to
understand the dynamics of domestic violence. Its decision is rife
with domestic violence myths and is pervaded by an overall
misperception of domestic violence as solely a “private” matter not
influenced by the state, and thus not worthy of the protection
afforded to bona fide refugees. On the other hand, the Board’s
reasoning is sound in some respects given the narrow confines of
asylum law, particularly with regard to social group formulation.
1.

Rejection of the social group due to the Board’s failure to understand the
dynamics of domestic violence
The Board’s majority opinion demonstrates a profound ignorance
of the dynamics of domestic violence relationships, the motivations of
an abuser, and the role of the state in perpetuating domestic
violence. The Board laments domestic violence but pointedly refuses
to acknowledge that it is anything more than an unfortunate private
occurrence, random in nature, and completely separate from the

141. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (BIA 1999), vacated and remanded
to stay reconsideration (A.G. 2001), remanded for reconsideration, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694
(A.G. 2005), lifted stay and remanded for reconsideration, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 927–28.
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types of state-sponsored forms of persecution for which refugee
144
protection was designed. The Board also mischaracterizes the role
that society plays in perpetuating domestic violence by failing to
145
recognize spousal abuse as an important societal attribute.
a.

Mischaracterization of domestic violence as random

The Board, intent on reinforcing the randomness and private
nature of domestic violence, peppers its decision with frequent
references to the lack of coherent motivation on the part of the
persecutor. For example, the Board notes the “seeming senselessness
146
and irrationality of his motives.”
The Board also states that “the
respondent’s husband harmed the respondent regardless of what she
147
actually believed or what he thought she believed.”
The Board’s perception of domestic violence as an unfortunate but
random occurrence is obvious in its interpretation of Ms. Alvarado’s
testimony:
The respondent testified that the abuse began “from the moment
[they] were married.” Even after the respondent “learned through
experience” to acquiesce to his demands, he still abused her. The
abuse took place before she left him initially, and it continued after
she returned to him. In fact, he said he “didn’t care” what she did
to escape because he would find her. He also hurt her before her
148
first call to the police and after her last plea for help.
....
The respondent stated that “[a]s time went on, he hit me for no
149
reason at all.”
....
When she asked for his motivation, he broke into a familiar refrain,
150
“I can do it if I want to.”
....
[T]he arbitrary nature of the attacks further suggests it was not the
respondent’s claimed social group characteristics that he sought to
overcome. The record indicates that there is nothing the

144. See id. at 914 (acknowledging the respondent’s situation with “great
sympathy” and holding “extreme contempt” for the actions of her husband, but
questioning if refugee law should supply the remedy).
145. Id. at 918.
146. Id. at 908.
147. Id. at 914.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 908.
150. Id. at 909.
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respondent could have done to have satisfied her husband and
151
prevented further abuse.
....
When asked on cross-examination, the respondent at first indicated
that she had no opinion of why her husband acted the way he did.
She supposed, however, that it was because he had been mistreated
when he was in the army . . . . The respondent believed he would abuse
152
any woman who was his wife.

The misdirected emphasis on the seeming randomness of the
abuse ignores one of the most fundamental realities of domestic
violence discussed in Part I of this Article: abusers never abuse
randomly. Each incident of abuse—whether physical, emotional, or
directed at a loved one of the actual target—is designed to forge and
maintain a wheel of control from which the Cycle of Violence gains
its momentum. Rodi Alvarado’s husband’s abuse was not random,
though it may have occurred at random intervals. On the contrary,
Alvarado’s husband abused her for two clearly identifiable reasons:
(1) to remind her of his control over her, and (2) to punish her when
she challenged that control.
b.

Failure to recognize the state’s complicity in the proliferation of
domestic violence

The Board also dismissed Rodi Alvarado’s claim for failure to state
a particular social group that represents an “important societal
153
attribute.” Specifically, the Board stated:
[Alvarado] has not shown that spouse abuse is itself an important
societal attribute, or, in other words, that the characteristic of
being abused is one that is important within Guatemalan
society . . . . [S]he has not shown that women are expected by
society to be abused, or that there are any adverse societal
consequences to women or their husbands if the women are not
154
abused.

This assertion is disingenuous at best. Clearly, Alvarado was not
arguing that Guatemalan society expects women to be abused by
their husbands. Rather, the social group she proposed suggests that
if women are abused, the Guatemalan government will fail to protect
them. The basis of this failure to protect is not a per se expectation
that women should and will be abused, but may reflect, perhaps, a
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 921.
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
Id. at 919.
Id.
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societal belief that a male’s treatment of his spouse is his prerogative.
That is, a man can decide to beat or not beat his wife; the state will
not interfere with that decision just as it will not interfere with the
man’s decision to buy or not buy property, to relocate or remain in
155
the same domicile, or to seek new employment.
The state’s refusal to protect abused women is consistent with the
state’s perception of women as a particular social group of beings
subordinate to men. The important societal attribute is women’s
subordination and subjugation to men’s will. As the dissent in Matter
of R-A- noted:
The record confirms the Immigration Judge’s finding that in
Guatemala there are “institutional biases against women that
prevent female victims of domestic violence from receiving
protection from their male companions or spouses.”
The
Immigration Judge found that these institutional biases “appear to
stem from a pervasive belief, common in patriarchal societies, that
a man should be able to control a wife or female companion by any
156
means he sees fit: including rape, torture, and beatings.”

c.

Blaming the victim

Another example of the Board’s failure to understand the
dynamics of domestic violence is its characterization of Rodi
Alvarado’s situation as one that she could have avoided by exercising
better judgment. In referencing the testimony of Dr. Doris Bersing,
an expert witness who testified regarding the prevalence of domestic
violence in Latin America, the Board stated that “if a woman chooses
the wrong husband [i.e., one who does not ‘honor, respect and take
155. See id. at 909. The Board described Alvarado’s interaction with the police in
Guatemala as follows:
The respondent’s pleas to Guatemalan police did not gain her protection.
On three occasions, the police issued summons [sic] for her husband to
appear, but he ignored them, and the police did not take further action.
Twice, the respondent called the police, but they never responded. When
the respondent appeared before a judge, he told her that he would not
interfere in domestic disputes.
Id.
156. Id. at 930 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting); USAID, The Women’s
Legal Rights Initiative Final Report 71 (2007) (asserting that not all Guatemalan women
know their rights because of certain Guatemalan social norms); see also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, Guatemala: No Protection, No Justice: Killings of Women (2006),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAMR340192006&lang=e
(“[T]he persistence of discriminatory legislation continues to mean that many forms
of gender-based violence against women—in particular violence against women in
the family and sexual harassment—go undetected. It also perpetuates violence
against women and fosters a climate of impunity for crimes committed against
women and girls.”).
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care of’ her but rather abuses her], her options are few in a country
157
The Board’s blithe reference to domestic
like Guatemala . . . .”
violence as a result of a poor choice of a spouse fails to recognize the
insidious nature of abusive relationships and inappropriately
minimizes the realities of domestic violence.
Using its flawed perception of abusive relationships, the Board
articulated two characteristics of Alvarado’s claim that doom it to
failure under the Board’s erroneous “classic refugee” analysis. First,
the Board noted that neither the members of the proposed particular
social group, nor the persecutors, view themselves as part of that
158
group.
Second, the Board held that even if Alvarado’s persecutor
had viewed her as part of that group, it was not clear that he would
159
harm her because she was a member of that group.
2.

Rejection of the social group due to flawed legal theories
As discussed above in Part II of this Article, a particular social
group must meet strict requirements in order to qualify for refugee
protection. The social group proposed by Alvarado—”women who
have been involved intimately with male companions who believe that
women are to live under male domination”—would be a viable social
group if gender were more readily accepted as a particular social
group in general. However, the Board rejected the asylum claim on
grounds that are likely to continue to plague domestic violence-based
asylum claims until there is a significant change in how gender-based
claims are viewed overall. First, the Board found that the lack of
recognition of the social group by its alleged members, by their
persecutors, and by their society in general defeated the possibility
160
that the group exists. Second, the Board found no nexus between
161
the proposed social group and the abuse. As discussed below, both
of these findings, to some degree, are correct.
a.

Lack of recognition of social group

The Board found that Alvarado’s claimed social group failed
because Alvarado did not show that “victims of spouse abuse view
themselves as members of this group, [or], most importantly, that
their male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 910.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 918–19.
Id. at 923.

2009]

REFUGEE PROTECTION FOR BATTERED WOMEN

369

162

group.”
In other words, unlike the ethnic tribe referenced in the
Introduction of this Article, women in abusive relationships do not
necessarily identify with a group of other women who share that
characteristic. According to the Board, there is no cohesive sense of
common identity, shared kinship, or shared history to bind the
163
women together, other than the fact that they are battered spouses.
To support its assertion, the Board noted that the persecutor
targeted only his wife, and did not target other members of the
proposed social group:
The record indicates that [the respondent’s husband] has targeted
only the respondent. The respondent’s husband has not shown an
interest in any member of this group other than the respondent
herself. The respondent fails to show how other members of the
group may be at risk of harm from him. If group membership
were the motivation behind his abuse, one would expect to see
some evidence of it manifested in actions toward other members of
164
the same group.

However, the Board failed to articulate why this is relevant or
consistent with the Refugee Convention. Neither the Convention
nor U.S. asylum law requires that an asylum applicant prove that her
particular persecutor is targeting other members of her social group.
Such a showing may support the applicant’s claim, but is not
165
determinative in and of itself.
Moreover, the Board’s insistence that a valid social group is
necessarily comprised of members fully cognizant of their
membership in the group further highlights the Board’s lack of
understanding of domestic violence as a societal problem. Domestic
violence, particularly in countries that are unable or unwilling to
162. Id. at 918.
163. See id. at 912 (requiring a “voluntary associational relationship among the
purported members” of a particular social group (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS,
801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986))).
164. Id. at 920.
165. In Matter of R-A-, the Board based this portion of its social group analysis in
part on Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1986), which involved a
particular social group consisting of “young, urban, working class males of military
age who have never served in the military or otherwise expressed support for the
government [of El Salvador].” See 22 I. & N. Dec. at 920. However, as the dissent
points out, the facts of Sanchez-Trujillo differ significantly from those of Matter of R-A-:
[Alvarado’s] case does not involve the type of all-encompassing grouping
posited in Sanchez-Trujillo, which arose in the context of countrywide civil
strife and anarchy. Here, the circumstances of group members who share
the immutable traits of gender and a relationship to an abusive partner are
distinct from those of other members of society who may fear general civil
strife, criminal assault or other social disorder.
Id. at 933 (Guendelsberger, Board Member, dissenting).
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protect victims, is the manifestation of a state belief in male
166
As part of the effort to control, marginalize and
dominance.
subjugate women, domestic violence is relegated to the private
167
sphere and is not openly discussed and attacked as a societal issue.
Resources for its victims are scarce, state protection from it is virtually
nonexistent, and blame for it falls on its victims rather than on its
168
perpetrators. In this environment, the fact that the members of the
particular social group are not identifying each other and rallying
together under a visible banner is hardly surprising.
The Board also took an overly narrow approach toward social
group formulation by holding that, in order to be valid, a particular
social group must be “recognized and understood to be a societal
faction, or . . . otherwise [be] a recognized segment of the
169
population, within [the applicant’s home country].”
Given that
one tactic of persecution is to force a subjugated group to remain
170
invisible, this requirement is unrealistic and inconsistent with the
principles of refugee protection.
166. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 939 (Guendelsberg, Board Member,
dissenting). The dissent stated,
[D]omestic violence exist[s] as a means by which men may systematically
destroy the power of women, a form of violence rooted in the economic,
social, and cultural subordination of women. The fundamental purpose of
domestic violence is to punish, humiliate, and exercise power over the victim
on account of her gender . . . .
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also id. (defining domestic violence as a “powerful
tool of oppression” against women that is “used to control women in . . . the home”
(quoting U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess., Supp.
No. 38, ¶ 26, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992))).
167. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence
as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 296 (1994) (arguing that the
consequences of private gender-based violence need to be viewed legally on the same
level as “other forms of inhumane subordinating official violence”).
168. See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 942 (suggesting that the Department of
Justice Guidelines should not distinguish between private forms of persecution, such
as the “heinous abuse” suffered by the respondent, and “public forms of persecution,
typically suffered by men”) (citing Kristin E. Kandt, United States Asylum Law:
Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 137, 144–45 (1995)); see also Pamela Goldberg, Anyplace But Home: Asylum in the
United States for Women Fleeing Intimate Violence, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 565, 591–92
(1993) (expressing concern about the lack of clarity of the definition of a “particular
social group” in the United States); Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing
the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 625 (1993) (presenting an
improved system for considering asylum for women through a multifaceted test).
169. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
170. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in
Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to
Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 51 (2008) (explaining that
“[t]he new ‘social visibility’ requirement raises the specter of the private/public
distinction by requiring members of a particular social group to have a public face,”
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In countries where protection from the batterer is not available,
battered women may feel compelled to remain invisible. The
psychology of abusive relationships is again illustrative. Battered
women usually blame themselves for the abuse, and they are ashamed
171
of the pity that their situation tends to evoke.
In a society that
implicitly condones domestic violence by failing to provide adequate
protection to the victim, the victim’s shame combines with a fear of
retribution, thereby intensifying the compulsion to remain silent and
172
invisible.
Even if one were to accept the assertion that a particular social
group must be a “recognized segment of the population,” the Board’s
approach toward the inquiry was still too narrow. In essence, the
Board failed to clarify who exactly must recognize the segment of the
population. The persecutors and the victims may not articulate the
social group; however, the existence of agencies and other resources
for domestic violence victims demonstrates that people within a
particular society do indeed consider battered women as a
recognized segment of the population.
b.

The lack of a nexus between the persecution and the proposed
social group

The Board pointed out that, even if there were a social group of
“women who have been involved intimately with male companions
who believe that women are to live under male domination,”
membership in such a social group, in and of itself, would not
173
motivate the persecutor to abuse his intimate partner. The Board’s
assertion is correct. The persecutor acts because he believes in male
domination and he seeks to achieve it through abuse. He does not
act because his intimate partner is in a relationship with him or
because he seeks to punish her for being in a relationship with him.
and that the requirement “may well result in the denial of asylum claims brought by
some of the most vulnerable individuals, notwithstanding the existence of a
‘protected characteristic’”).
171. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 22, at 63.
172. See Marouf, supra note 170, at 94–95 (explaining that a woman’s inclination
to maintain the secrecy of her domestic victimization may stem from both individual
level factors, including “fear that their children may also become victims, financial or
psychological dependence on the abuser, lack of social support, fear of being blamed
by society, or general feelings of helplessness,” as well as societal level factors,
including the “widespread social tolerance and the social prominence of an idealized
view of the home and family life,” “social stigma,” “social norms that legitimate or
even glorify domestic violence against women,” “social isolation,” and “[d]eep-rooted
ideas about the privacy of the family”).
173. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918–19.
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Alvarado’s claimed social group does not fully capture the reason
for the persecution. A batterer does not abuse a woman who has
been involved intimately with him merely because she has been
involved intimately with him or because the abuser believes in male
domination. Rather, the batterer abuses the woman because she has
challenged the batterer’s closely held belief in male domination by
leaving the relationship.
This challenge fuels the batterer’s
motivation to persecute the woman.
B. The Department of Justice’s Proposed Regulations
On December 7, 2000, the Department of Justice issued proposed
regulations intended to provide “generally applicable principles that
will allow for case-by-case adjudication of claims based on domestic
violence or other serious harm inflicted by individual non-state
174
actors.”
One of the Department’s stated reasons for issuing the
proposed regulations was to “address analytical issues that have arisen
in the context of some claims based on domestic violence, and in
175
particular in the Board’s decision in In re R-A- . . . .”
The
Department also sought to clarify and homogenize some of the
various approaches to social group formulation. Although it is useful
that the Department rejected the Board’s strict approach, the
proposed regulations fall short of guaranteeing refugee protection
for battered women.
1.

Rejection of the Board’s restrictions on establishing a valid particular
social group
The preamble to the proposed regulations confirms that two
particular factors upon which the Board relied to deny asylum in
Matter of R-A-—whether the social group is “a recognized segment of
176
and whether the applicant’s society draws
the population”
distinctions “between those who share and those who do not share
177
the characteristic” —are factors which the Board may consider but
“are not determinative of the question of whether a valid social group
178
exists.”
The proposed regulations state that the following factors
must be considered:
(1) sharing a “common, immutable
characteristic . . . that a member either cannot change or that is so
174. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,589 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
175. Id. at 76,592.
176. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
177. Id. at 919.
178. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,594.
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fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that he or
179
she should not be required to change it,” and (2) having a past
experience—if it defines the group—that, when it occurred, “the
member either could not have changed or was so fundamental to his
or her identity or conscience that he or she should not have been
180
required to change it.”
If an adjudicator understands the dynamics and psychology of
abusive relationships, the proposed regulatory language may be
sufficient to ensure a grant of asylum based on several social group
formulations, including that of “women who have fled severely
abusive relationships.” The past experience of having left the
relationship defines the social group and represents an immutable
characteristic. Even if a woman is forced to return to her abuser, the
fact that she left is immutable, or at least is fundamental to her
181
identity or conscience once she leaves the relationship.
An
adjudicator who understands the danger of separation violence
would likely have little difficulty finding that the applicant fits within
the definition of a refugee.
The problem demonstrated so clearly by the majority opinion in
Matter of R-A-, however, is that too many adjudicators do not
understand the complex dynamics of abusive relationships. If this
continues to be true, the proposed regulatory language would
therefore fail to achieve its stated goal of “aid[ing] in the assessment
of claims made by applicants who have suffered or fear domestic
182
violence.”
2.

Failure to articulate a specific basis for asylum claims based on
domestic violence
Although the proposed regulations attempt to create a viable
framework for adjudicating domestic violence-based asylum claims,
they do not specifically refer to domestic violence claims except in
183
In fact, the Department of Justice specifically
the preamble.
declined to articulate a rule for deciding domestic violence-based
asylum claims in favor of “broadly applicable principles to guide
adjudicators in applying the refugee definition and other statutory
184
and regulatory provisions generally” :
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 76,598.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588.
Id. at 76,595.
Id.
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The Department [of Justice] has tentatively concluded that this
approach would be more useful than simply announcing a
categorical rule that a victim of domestic violence is or can be a
refugee on account of that experience or fear . . . . The current
proposal of the Department would encourage development of the
law in the area of domestic violence as well as in other new claims
185
that may arise.

The Department of Justice’s failure to articulate a specific basis
upon which battered women can qualify for asylum, however, leaves
such applicants vulnerable to erroneous adjudication by fact-finders
who are not familiar with the psychology of domestic violence.
Moreover, the Department’s “broadly applicable principles” are
nothing more than a codification of case law existing long before the
Board denied Alvarado asylum. For example, the regulations state
that an asylum applicant must establish:
that the persecutor acted, or that there is a reasonable possibility
that the persecutor would act, against the applicant on account of
the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, or on account of what
the persecutor perceives to be the applicant’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
186
opinion.

This rule merely restates U.S. asylum law as it has existed for
decades. It does not provide any clarification, beyond what is stated
in the preamble, as to how an adjudicator should apply this rule to
battered women.
The same problem arises with respect to the section of the
proposed rule dealing with membership in a particular social group.
That section states:
A particular social group is composed of members who share a
common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, color, kinship ties,
or past experience, that a member either cannot change or that is
so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that
187
he or she should not be required to change it.
188

This is a mere restatement of Matter of Acosta, a precedential
189
decision of the Board issued in 1985.
The preamble emphasizes

185. Id.
186. Id. at 76,597–98.
187. Id. at 76,598.
188. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985).
189. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593 (declaring
that the proposed regulation codifies the reasoning of Matter of Acosta, “[t]he key
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that gender is an immutable trait and that marriage and other
190
intimate relationships may be considered immutable traits.
However, without a clear directive, an adjudicator might still fail to
recognize that a battered woman is being persecuted on account of
her membership in a particular social group.
The preamble to the proposed regulations attempts to provide a
reasonable framework for granting asylum to battered women. The
preamble also corrects and clarifies several errors that the Board
made in Matter of R-A-. However, by failing to articulate a clear basis
for granting refugee protection, and by failing to address domestic
violence specifically in the regulations themselves, the proposed
regulations fail to ensure that women who have fled from severely
abusive relationships will receive refugee protection.
C. The Department of Homeland Security’s 2004 Proposed Social Group:
“Married Women in Guatemala Who are Unable to Leave the Relationship”
As a result of the Board’s rejection of Alvarado’s claimed social
group, the Board sustained the appeal of the Immigration and
191
Naturalization Service (INS) and reversed the grant of asylum.
As discussed above, this appeal was not the end of the Alvarado case.
Three different U.S. Attorneys General have certified the case for
review, and each side has had the opportunity to re-litigate its
192
position.
In a somewhat surprising turn of events (given that it originated
from the party that initially opposed a grant of asylum for Rodi
Alvarado), the Department of Homeland Security stated, in a brief
submitted to Attorney General John Ashcroft in 2004, that it believed
193
that Rodi Alvarado was eligible for asylum. However, the definition
of the social group upon which the Department of Homeland
Security based this eligibility was critically flawed.
The Department asserted that Alvarado was eligible for asylum as a
member of the particular social group, “married women in
194
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.”
This social
Board decision on the meaning of a ‘particular social group’ [which] requires that
members of the group share a ‘common, immutable’ trait”).
190. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593.
191. Id. at 928. The INS prosecuted immigration cases before the Department of
Homeland Security was created.
192. Recently, the case was remanded to a local immigration judge in San
Francisco. See E-mail from Karen Musalo to Author (Apr. 16, 2009) (on file with
Author).
193. DHS Brief 2004, supra note 9, at 43.
194. Id. at 36.
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group must fail because it does not accurately describe the
individuals it seeks to encompass and too narrowly characterizes the
social group of battered women.
The proposed social group mischaracterizes its members as
individuals who are unable to leave their relationships. To state the
obvious, however, it is clear that if they were unable to leave their
relationships, they would not be in the United States applying for
asylum. The assumption implicit in this proposed social group is
that, if the applicants were to return to their countries, they would be
unable to escape their abusers. But the proposed social group fails to
encapsulate one of the most important aspects of an abusive
relationship: the abuser is not motivated to persecute because the
woman cannot leave the relationship; rather, the abuser is motivated
to persecute because the woman can and did leave the relationship.
Moreover, the phrase “unable to leave the relationship” is vague
and vulnerable to misconstruction. A battered spouse, for example,
may be able to leave the relationship by obtaining a civil divorce, but
she may decline to do so because the state lacks the capacity and
willingness to protect her once she does. The fact that she has a
means of officially leaving the relationship by securing a divorce
should not prevent her from obtaining asylum in the United States.
Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security improperly
narrowed the social group by including the applicant’s marital status
in its social group formulation. Alvarado’s status as a married woman
certainly may have contributed to both the state’s unwillingness to
protect her as well as her personal reasons for staying in the
relationship for any length of time. However, a woman who is being
persecuted by a family member on account of her membership in a
particular social group defined by her defiance of the persecutor’s
authority should not be denied asylum just because there was no valid
marriage. If the state is just as unwilling to protect an unmarried
woman as it is a married woman, U.S. asylum law should not
discriminate against unmarried women whose lives are in danger.
Finally, the Department limited the effectiveness of its proposed
social group by making the proposal dependent on the finalization of
proposed regulations governing the adjudication of gender based
195
claims.
While admitting that the proposed regulations “do[] not
196
address domestic violence per se,” the Department nevertheless

195. Id. at 6.
196. Id. at 5.
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“urge[d] the Attorney General to order the Board to grant asylum
without an opinion, or to wait for promulgation of the final rule
197
As discussed below, however, the
before deciding this case.”
regulations to which the Department of Homeland Security referred
are not sufficient to protect battered women from adjudicators who
are not familiar with the dynamics and the psychology of abusive
relationships.
D. The Department of Homeland Security’s 2009 Proposed Social Group:
“Women Who Are Viewed as Property by Virtue of Their Positions Within a
Domestic Relationship”
In a promising development, the Department of Homeland
Security under the Obama administration has articulated a favorable
stance toward the asylum claims of domestic violence survivors—
a stance even more accepting of battered women’s claims than that
put forward in 2004. In a brief for a case involving a Mexican
198
domestic violence survivor, the Department posited two particular
social groups under which domestic violence survivors may prove
eligibility for asylum. The first social group is similar to that which
the Department put forward in Matter of R-A-, “women in domestic
199
relationships who are unable to leave,” and thus suffers from the
same flaw discussed above. The second is “women who are viewed as
200
property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”
The second proposed social group does not contain the same basic
flaw present in the first social group. It does, however, present other
concerns. The first is that the social group relies entirely on the
persecutor’s perception of the asylum applicant, a fact that may raise
significant evidentiary problems for the applicant. Unless an abuser
specifically makes a statement or acts in a way that leads an
adjudicator to find that the asylum applicant was viewed as property,
197. Id. at 6. The Department of Homeland Security also urged that the decision
to grant asylum be “limited as much as possible to the particular facts of this case.”
Id. at 4.
198. Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief at 14, Matter of L-R(BIA Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter “DHS Brief 2009”], available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf.
The Obama Administration also recently filed a brief in support of Rodi Alvarado’s
asylum claim. See Department of Homeland Security Response to the Resp’t’s
Supplemental Filing of August 18, 2009, Matter of Rodi Alvarado-Pena (San Francisco
Immigration Court, Oct. 28, 2009) (stating that the Department of Homeland
Security “maintains that the respondent . . . is eligible for asylum and merits a grant
of asylum as a matter of discretion”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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the asylum claim may fail. It is the burden of the asylum applicant to
201
sustain her claim, and presenting testimony and other evidence
sufficient to establish that the persecutor viewed her as property may
prove difficult.
The evidentiary issue raises a second concern, which is that the
proposed social group relies on a subjective determination that the
actions of the persecutor amount to viewing the asylum-seeker as
property. Some adjudicators may equate physical abuse, jealousy,
possessiveness, and other abusive behavior with viewing the object of
the abuse as property, but other adjudicators may not. Such a
subjective determination is not feasible in light of the fact that the
asylum-seeker must prove that her membership in the social group
202
was “one central reason” for the persecution she suffered. Even if
the asylum applicant provides testimony and other evidence proving
that her husband abused her, if the adjudicator does not believe that
she was abused because of the central reason that the persecutor
viewed her as property, the asylum claim may fail.
Given these flaws in the proposed social groups, one cannot
conclude that battered women’s asylum claims will necessarily find
widespread acceptance. Nevertheless, it is indeed promising that the
Department of Homeland Security appears receptive to domestic
violence-based asylum in the United States. The social group posited
below may prove effective in utilizing the Department’s willingness to
recognize domestic violence as a basis for asylum.
IV. NEW SOCIAL GROUP: “WOMEN WHO HAVE FLED SEVERELY
ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS”
Refugee protection should be available to applicants who can
prove that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of their membership in the particular social group of
“women who have fled severely abusive relationships.” Such an
individual possesses an immutable trait in that she has left the abusive
relationship and has thereby irrevocably challenged the abuser’s
power and control. The applicant must prove that, if she is sent back
to her country, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the abuser
will find her and inflict even greater harm on her, or possibly even
kill her, on account of her membership in the particular social group.
She must prove that her government is unwilling or unable to protect
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).
202. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
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her from the abuse. If she proves these elements, the applicant
possesses a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her
membership in a valid social group, and qualifies for refugee
protection.
A. Past Persecution and Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
An applicant may establish a rebuttable presumption of future
203
persecution if she suffered persecution in the past.
An asylum
applicant who has fled an abusive relationship may rely on past
persecution if she had previously attempted to flee the relationship
and consequently suffered separation violence at the hands of her
204
abuser.
Such past persecution would raise a rebuttable
presumption that she will again suffer separation violence if she is
205
sent back to her home country.
If the applicant had not previously fled the relationship, she must
independently establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.
In order to prove that her fear of persecution upon return is
well-founded, she must prove that her subjective fear of future
persecution is objectively reasonable by meeting the test set forth in
206
Matter of Mogharrabi and discussed in Part II above: (1) she must
possess a characteristic or belief that the persecutor seeks to
overcome by punishing her; (2) the persecutor must be aware or
could become aware of the characteristic or belief; (3) the persecutor
must be capable of punishing her; and (4) the persecutor must be
207
The punishable characteristic is the
inclined to punish her.
applicant’s ability and willingness to challenge her abuser’s authority
by leaving the relationship. The persecutor becomes aware of this
characteristic as soon as the applicant leaves the relationship. The
persecutor’s physical, mental, and emotional capability to inflict
punishment is established by the abusive dynamics of the
relationship. The persecutor’s inclination to inflict punishment is
also established by the abusive nature of the relationship as well as by
the reality of separation violence. The characteristic of being able
and willing to leave the relationship also operates as the central
reason for the persecution.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) & (2) (2009).
Id.
Id.
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
Id. at 446 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (BIA 1985)).
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This leads to the inquiry of whether the persecution feared is based
on a protected ground, namely, membership in a particular social
group. Here, the relevant analysis is whether the particular social
group of “women who have fled abusive relationships” withstands the
various restrictions governing social group formulations.
B. Immutability of the Trait of Having Left an Abusive Relationship
The most fundamental component of a valid social group is a
characteristic or belief that a member cannot change, or one that is
so fundamental to her identity that she should not be required to
208
change it.
Leaving an abusive relationship is an immutable
characteristic. The abused woman can return to the relationship
voluntarily or forcibly, but she cannot change the fact that she took
the actual step of leaving. The psychology of abusive relationships is
such that the abuser continues the physical and emotional abuse
specifically to establish and maintain control over his partner, and to
punish any challenge to that control. Once a battered woman has
left the relationship, she has irrevocably challenged her abuser’s
power. If she returns or is forcibly returned, she runs the risk of a
significant increase in violence.
If the abuser perceives the woman’s leaving as final, he may even
go so far as to kill her. His aim, again, is control. Killing his intimate
partner, who has defied him by leaving, is the ultimate exercise of
209
control over his partner.
C. Flood of Battered Women?
Introduction of the social group “women who have fled severely
abusive relationships” might lead to concerns that a flood of battered
women from around the world will seek refugee protection in the
United States. Although this is a practical rather than a legal
210
question,
given the fear of “opening the floodgates” to an
overwhelming number of refugees by approving an overly broad
211
social group, it is nevertheless an important consideration.
208. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
209. WILSON & DALY, HOMICIDE, supra note 65, at 208.
210. There is nothing in the Refugee Convention or in U.S. asylum law that limits
the number of asylum seekers who may receive asylum status in the United States.
211. Compare Musalo, Floodgates, supra note 89, at 120 (discounting the fear of
floodgates by emphasizing contrary historical trends and by addressing underlying
causes of human rights violations rather than turning away victims), with Niang v.
Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (“There may be understandable
concern in using gender as a group-defining characteristic. One may be reluctant to
permit, for example, half a nation’s residents to obtain asylum on the ground that
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In addressing the “floodgates” concern, it is important to recall
that asylum is only available to “women who have fled severely abusive
relationships” if the members of that particular social group also
meet the other elements of the refugee definition. Domestic
violence occurs in the United States and other Western and
developed countries, as well as across all ethnic and socioeconomic
groups. As discussed above, however, a member of this group must
prove that her country does not have the resources or willingness to
protect her from separation violence. A citizen of a country that does
have the resources and willingness to protect her would not meet the
definition of a refugee and thus would not qualify for asylum in the
United States.
Even in cases involving countries that cannot or will not protect
battered women, it is unlikely that battered women seeking asylum
will overwhelm the United States in record-high numbers. First, the
unique dynamics of abusive relationships prevent many women from
leaving their abusive relationships at all. Second, even if a woman
succeeds in breaking the Cycle of Violence and flees the abusive
relationship, she may not necessarily desire to flee her country and
family.
As discussed above, the Cycle of Violence can be an extremely
powerful barrier to a woman’s escape from an abusive relationship
even in situations where support and resources are available.
Possessiveness, isolation, and other controlling behavior masquerade
as protectiveness and love; demeaning remarks and humiliating
incidents shatter the victim’s self-esteem; threats to harm the victim
or her children, or threats to self-inflict harm or commit suicide
intimidate the victim; the threats escalate to beatings and other
violent behavior that keeps the victim in a constant state of terror;
and finally the calm respite brings back into focus the abusive
behavior masquerading as affection. In far too many cases, even in
countries like the United States that provide resources and protection
to battered women, women are never fully able to break free of the
Cycle of Violence.
Even if a woman does manage to break free of the Cycle of
Violence, this does not necessarily mean that she will take the drastic
women are persecuted there.”), and Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994)
(dismissing the applicant’s assertion that “Iranian women, by virtue of their innate
characteristic (their sex) and the harsh restrictions placed upon them, are a
particular social group” by declaring that “this category is overbroad, because no
factfinder could reasonably conclude that all Iranian women had a well-founded fear
of persecution based solely on their gender”).
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step of leaving her country to seek asylum abroad. Fleeing to another
country can be prohibitively expensive and risky. This is especially
true if the woman is unable to obtain a visa to enter a safe country
legally and must rely on smugglers or other illegal channels to reach
safety. Fleeing to another country often requires leaving behind
children and other loved ones, particularly if the woman needs to
obtain the abuser’s permission to leave the country with their
children.
Battered women who manage to flee to the United States in order
to seek asylum will thus have to have overcome two powerful
obstacles: (1) the strong emotional and psychological factors that
compel battered women to remain with their abusers, and (2) the
excruciating decision to leave behind their country and family. The
formidability of these obstacles minimizes the likelihood that a flood
of battered women will descend upon the United States to seek
asylum.
The Board’s recognition of a social group based on vulnerability to
another form of physical abuse, female genital mutilation (“FGM”),
also called female genital cutting (“FGC”), met with similar fears, but
212
a flood of FGM refugees has not materialized. In Matter of Kasinga
(a misspelling of the applicant’s last name, Kassindja), the Board
held that a young woman who feared being forced by her aunt and
213
husband to undergo FGC was eligible for asylum.
Karen Musalo
has described the effects of the Kasinga decision as follows:
[M]any who opposed a grant of asylum pointed to the fact that
millions of women a year are subject to FGC [female genital
cutting], and predicted that the U.S. would be overwhelmed with
asylum seekers if it recognized fear of FGC as a basis of asylum.
Fauziya Kassindja was granted asylum, but the dire predictions of a
flood of women seeking asylum never materialized. In fact an INS
publication explicitly noted that “[a]lthough genital mutilation is
practiced on many women around the world, INS has not seen an
appreciable increase in the number of claims based on FGM” after
the Kasinga decision. In this same publication, INS stated that it
did not expect to see a large number of claims if the U.S.
214
recognized domestic violence as a basis of asylum.

The similarity between domestic violence and FGM is striking. The
oppression and manipulation of women in order to assure male

212. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).
213. Id. at 367.
214. Musalo, Floodgates, supra note 89, at 132–33.
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dominance and exploitation are common to both forms of
persecution, as is the fact that both forms of persecution constitute
severe bodily invasions. One significant difference is that FGM may
215
be perceived to be performed with benign intent, whereas domestic
violence cannot, under any circumstances, be perceived as benign—
a difference which only highlights the peculiar disparity in how the
Board treats these two forms of gender-based persecution.
Another important similarity between FGM and domestic violence
is the degree of state complicity in, or helplessness to prevent, the
persecution. The cultural, religious, and social customs of a
particular society influence governmental responses to FGM and
domestic violence to a much greater degree than they do in other
216
claims involving private actors.
For example, a country may be
beleaguered by drug cartels to such a degree that the government is
unable to protect citizens who defy a powerful cartel. In that
situation, however, the cartel is viewed universally—by the
government and by the citizens—as a plague on society. In the
situation of domestic violence, however, in countries unwilling or
unable to protect its citizens from abusers, domestic violence is a
long-existing, long-condoned means of maintaining what that society
has long considered to be the proper order of society: men as
217
dominant and women as subordinate, particularly within the family.
In light of these striking similarities, the difference in the Board’s
treatment of FGM claims versus domestic violence claims is
unfathomable. The Board’s fear that granting asylum to women who
have fled severely abusive relationships will open the floodgates to
215. See id. at 365 (affirming that “subjective ‘punitive’ or ‘malignant’ intent is not
required for harm to constitute persecution”).
216. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, Naturalism in International Adjudication, 18 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 395, 416 (2008). Kelly argues,
Even though female genital mutilation (FGM) or female circumcision may
be abhorrent and injurious to health, it is not clear that it is a form of
discrimination that violates the Convention when the participants (women
and young girls) believe that this traditional practice is a constituent part of
their culture.
Id. Additionally, see L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275,
284 (1997). Obiora explains,
Female circumcision does not easily fall within the traditional definition of a
gender-specific human rights violation, nor does it seem completely
analogous to violent coercion of women by men. It is usually performed for
socio-cultural reasons by predominantly female private actors with the
apparent consent of the circumcised or her proxy.
217. See DHS Brief 2004, supra note 9, at 27 (acknowledging that Rodi Alvarado’s
husband persecuted her because of “his perception that subordination is created
through the marital bond,” a perception bolstered by societal expectations).
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vast numbers of individuals seeking asylum on the basis of improper
grounds is unfounded at best and disingenuous at worst. It again
points to the deep misunderstanding of the psychology of domestic
violence that led to the Matter of R-A- decision.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of R-A-,
and the failure of the INS and its successor agency, the Citizenship
and Immigration Services, to issue appropriate final regulations have
resulted in an unconscionable delay of nearly ten years in the case of
Rodi Alvarado and other survivors of severe domestic violence. For
many applicants, this delay has resulted in separation from their
children and other loved ones, precarious immigration status, and
the return of despondent applicants to countries where they face
severe harm and even death at the hands of their abusers.
The particular social group of “women who have fled severely
abusive relationships” provides adjudicators with the key to ending
this deplorable stalemate. In light of the psychological realities of
abusive relationships, the social group is sufficiently narrow. It is
comprised of women who possess the immutable characteristic of
having irrevocably challenged the authority of their abusers.
Although state action is not required for an applicant to meet the
definition of a refugee, the persecution of the members of the
particular social group carries with it the imprimatur of centuries of
state-sponsored and society-sponsored male domination over women
and the ongoing desire to preserve that dynamic. It is therefore the
legal obligation of the United States to provide asylum to members of
the social group of “women who have fled severely abusive
relationships.”

